From: Mark Waser (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sun Jan 18 2004 - 18:29:56 MST
> How so? That everything is going to exist anyway doesn't say that it
> pointless for your or I to have a morality that guides what *we* choose to
I'm trying to rule out the infinite multiple worlds view. My arguments DO
rely on the premise that there is scarcity and that in many cases, the fact
that something exists means that it exists instead of something else. Or,
in simpler words, I am aware that the infinite multiple worlds view implies
infinite diversity and therefore renders any discussion of morality
evaluation by diversity somewhat nonsensical. Note, however, that I also
see this failure in other morality models (for example, those which have
been handled incorrectly in previous SL4 discussions by altering the
probabilities of infinite hells when arguments about post hoc probability
alteration are also provably moot when everything exists).
> Is such a guide pointless unless universally adhered to unfailingly?
For the purposes of Friendly AI, I am leery of any guide that has edge
cases. For normal purposes though, good general guidelines are never
pointless even if they are occasionally (non-catastrophically) incorrect.
> Since your primary basis for morality was diversity without specifying
> anything else about what kinds of "diversity" are acceptable, the question
> had to be asked. If there are criteria for what kinds of "diversity" is
> acceptable then it seems to me that "diversity" cannot be your primary
> moral criteria.
I agree with both your points and am trying to answer your question. I am
not setting any criteria for what kinds of diversity are acceptable. I am
making the statement, however, that I believe that certain kinds of
diversity lead to less future diversity. Therefore, by the top level goal
of increasing diversity, these diversity-reducing diversities are less good
than diversity-increasing diversities.
> You are begging the question as you are positing that the greatest
> diversity always comes from what you would consider happy or morally
> > conditions.
Therefore, my arguments are falsifiable by showing where a happy or morally
correct condition by common sense/the real world) leads to lesser diversity
in the long run. I invite you to provide such a counter-example.
> But since your measure of these happy conditions was "diversity" we go
> round in circles. The greatest diversity comes from that which leads to
> > greatest diversity.
I would argue that any good complete morality system has to be a tautology
within itself. The trick is finding one which aligns with common sense/the
real world and provides evaluative/predictive value.
P.S. Am I getting any more convincing? :-)
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