Re: [sl4] Uploading (was : goals of AI)

From: Frank Adamek (
Date: Fri Dec 04 2009 - 07:39:17 MST

--- On Fri, 12/4/09, Stathis Papaioannou <> wrote:

> I  agree that those are the objective facts of the matter. That this is a merely semantic difference to you displays that either you do not believe in a subjective experience, or that you have no concern for it. With regards to your own life I have no problem with the second (no snide remark just a support for self-determination), but for any who might care about the subjective, it seems dangerous and lacking in sufficient evidence to assume that it does not exist.

I believe in subjective experience and I think it's the most important
thing in the world. But I don't think there is any logical difference
between actually being the same person from day to day or - all else
being equal - only having the illusion of being the same person from
day to day.

Stathis Papaioannou
I should have rephrased that, I specifically meant something more along the lines of expecting to subjectively experience the future. Even so, this belief is much more prevalent among those fond of destructive uploading than I would have thought. I'd be curious to hear your perspectives on something.
These questions require the treatment of individual (identical) instances as as seperate people. That is, if another 'you' is made, both of you are still around, we'll have PersonA and PersonB. You might treat PersonA as the one standing in your position prior to copying (the "old you"), but I don't think it matters. Without this distinction, "you" always experience anything an instance of you does, as "you" has been (or could be) defined to mean any and all instances of you. The discussion should be made clearer by finer distinctions of where one does or doesn't agree; disagreeing on this point makes the other question moot. 
So three copies now exist, Persons A, B, and C. PersonA has no food, B eats an apple, C a banana, and I (also there) eat an orange. What sensation do you expect PersonA to experience? If ve will somehow experience the apple or banana, why not my orange? 
I asked John Clark a similar question, and he's invited to answer this or the following alteration on the Antartica thing (now sans-destruction!): PersonA stays home, PersonB is created on Antartica, and AfricanWoman lives in Africa. Should you expect PersonA to experience Antartica, or Africa? 
Without using the definition of "you" as all instances of you (where again by definition, "you" will then experience every thing an instance of you does), I don't see any reason we should expect PersonA to have experiences not linked with PersonA's own body (and cyborg augmentations, etc). But I've been surprised before and would love to hear new perspectives. 
-Frank Adamek


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