From: Krekoski Ross (rosskrekoski@gmail.com)
Date: Wed Feb 04 2009 - 18:29:48 MST
Of course, for what its worth, strictly exact copies down to the quantum
level are impossible.
On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 5:41 AM, Charles Hixson
<charleshixsn@earthlink.net>wrote:
> OK. Let me try again in different words.
> "Me" is those things I can exert control over. When I drive, the car is a
> part of me. This is (more or less) confirmed by brain scans. When a
> chimpanzee uses a tool, it sees that tool as a part of itself. In this
> sense, my near future is also a part of me. I can control what's going to
> happen (to some reasonable extent).
>
> Mine is those things I claim the right to exert control over (to some
> extent). (My wife would certainly question my right to exert very much
> control. So would my dog, though to a lesser extent.)
>
> Who I am is not an all-or-nothing kind of relation. My hand remains my
> hand, even if I loose it in an accident. If I'm lucky and quick it can be
> reattached.
>
> Therefore, position the "transporter" as described, I (present) would
> decline to use it because I don't want to be tortured to death. And, as
> described, the I before transmission would, indeed, be tortured to death,
> even though an I would survive that did not experience that. At the time
> after the "transport" has occurred, the two entities have become separate.
> They no longer experience each other as indistinguishable. However, before
> the transport they were indistinguishable, due to identity.
>
> In the brain scans of animals (and to a much lesser extent of people) tests
> show that during the use of a tool, the tool is considered a part of the
> body. When you feel with a stick, you are feeling with the stick, not with
> your fingers. Because that's how the brain records it. At that point the
> stick is indistinguishable from you. When you drop it, you also drop the
> connection. Then it is seen as separate.
>
> There's nothing mysterious about it, though I may have explained things
> poorly. It's a function of how and what the brain (i.e., the mind operating
> within the brain) records the stimuli.
>
>
> Vladimir Nesov wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 3:44 AM, Andrew Hay <andwhay@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> "all sufficiently indistinguishable versions of myself are me" seems to
>>> be a
>>> rather strong statement without the required strong evidence/reasoning
>>> backing it up.
>>>
>>> Not that I'm helping, because I don't know the answer. Perhaps it is a
>>> fault
>>> at 'indistinguishable'? in any case, I can't be safe to assume that
>>> unless
>>> we have a good understanding of what the meaning behind "me" is.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Concepts are definitions, following regularities in the world, and
>> humans assign (context-sensitive) instrumental utility to the concepts
>> according to role of those regularities in overall structure of the
>> world, from the contexts in which the concepts apply. When we are
>> talking about "me", there is instrumental utility attached, and this
>> instrumental utility won't translate well to different regularities,
>> or to different contexts in which this regularity is placed. I say
>> "instrumental" in the sense of being a component in representation of
>> the utility over whole timelines, even though things marked
>> instrumental this way may be seen as terminal values.
>>
>> One of the core properties of the concept "me" is that it's singular
>> (at any time). When the concept changes to accommodate the possibility
>> of multiple people, so should its instrumental utility. It doesn't
>> follow that when there are multiple identical people, each of them is
>> as valuable from your or anyone's perspective as the single original.
>> Maybe so, maybe not, but no easy answer. We don't need the
>> understanding of "me", "me" doesn't apply. We need the understanding
>> of values, as applied to the discussed context.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
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