From: Lee Corbin (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sat Mar 08 2008 - 00:44:36 MST
>> Whose anticipated experience? The subjects? In their own boxes
>> they'll each have experience. I thought the question was whether
>> those experiences should be completely *identified*, that is,
>> regarded as one and the same experience. (My answer was no,
>> they should not be, since they're causally separate processes
>> that might even be light years apart.)
> This is what I mean. Is there a difference in what the subjects would
> experience if you're right about separateness vs. if you're wrong?
Oh, no, there would be no difference in what the subjects experience.
By *identified*, I mean for the purposes of prefering the multiplicity
over the running of just a single instance. In other words, it is twice
as good for me to be running in two places rather than one.
Some people differ. I believe that thought experiments can be constructed
to place them in more awkwardness than they can place holders of my
view. For example, start changing one of the two instantiations an atom
at a time...
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