Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 12:52:46 MST

Nick Tarleton wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 9:23 AM, Lee Corbin <> wrote:
>> No, as causally separate process, each is separately conscious,
>> even if isomorphic (according to me).
> What's the difference in anticipated experience between this and them
> not being separate? (
> )

If you flip a fair quantum coin, have your exoself generate 100
separated isomorphic copies of you conditional on the coin coming up
heads, then, when (all of) you are about to look at the coin, should
your subjective anticipation of seeing "heads" be 1:1 or 100:1?

This is a question that confuses even me, btw.

Eliezer S. Yudkowsky                
Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence

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