Continuity of Conscious

From: Aj Cann (
Date: Sat Apr 01 2006 - 15:31:00 MST

Perhaps this discussion has before been approached, in that case I
apologize. This is my first contribution to this mailing list and if
I've failed in anyway to meet the standards of your, quite
informative, list please do not hesitate to call me out.

     The matter I bring up concerns itself with the concept of the
upload, or rather continued existence of an individual in the absence
of an original body, and of course a biological brain. Originally my
worry with the issue was the much discussed argument that merely a
copy of the individual's conscious would exist and that from the
ego-centric perspective of the original they would no longer exist. Of
course the copy would still believe itself to be the original
conscious entity, or at least be aware that it felt it was.

    Now, hopefully I am not treading into the topic of something like
the soul, but rather an issue of continuity of consciousness from an
egoistic point of view. I'm aware that for all intents and purposes
the upload would in fact be the original individual in temperament,
experience and other individual traits, however this does not deflect
the problem that as the original ego I will still cease to exist if my
biological brain or body ceased to function, of course this is only
from my ego's point of view.

    Finally, if there are no major issues with my logic above, though
I no doubt will find that assertion incorrect shortly, I purpose a
solution that would suit my own personal worries. As the human mind
becomes augmented by technology to greater degrees and specifically to
the point where some thought processes and cycles are offloaded to
non-biological brain components, a directed effort to push ego into
the realm of simulations and virtual existence can commence to the
point where one feels at home in both the virtual and physical worlds
as well as being able to shift focus between the two at will.

Thanks for reading, sorry if it got to be a bit lengthy and comments
would be much appreciated of course. -- Andrew Cann

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