From: Daniel Radetsky (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Tue Aug 02 2005 - 20:25:33 MDT
On Tue, 2 Aug 2005 21:34:16 -0400
Randall Randall <email@example.com> wrote:
> This is not entirely accurate. Exploits are shorthand for
> "things we didn't think of or protect against, which could
> be used to escape from containment". Psychological tricks
> are one kind of possible exploit, but are a very mundane
> example of them, and hence likely to lull us with the idea
> that we can protect against exploits in general.
That was not how I was using the term. I think it's useful to distinguish
between sweet-talking and box-exploits, and I also think that those exaust the
possibilities for escaping from a box.
> I *believe* that Eliezer's point is merely that anything
> you don't think of or don't protect against can ruin your
> day, not that there is a necessarily a specific physical
Remember, 'cans' are not the issues; the problem is with 'might-very-wells.'
> In any case, the general thing to take away, in my opinion,
> is that since anything you don't think of might in principle
> result in failure to contain, plugging any number of specific
> leaks or classes thereof is not going to reduce the potential
> problem space
Who cares about the "potential problem space"? Unless you are sneaking some
amount of "likely" into "potential," you're just continuing to ignore my point.
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