From: Ben Goertzel (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Tue Jul 26 2005 - 11:52:24 MDT
"Hard" in the sense that Chalmers meant it is "conceptually hard" -- i.e.,
conceptually baffling ...
Making a complete deterministic model of the behaviors of
entities-that-allege-themselves-conscious is of course very difficult as a
matter of practice, but is not conceptually baffling in the sense that
connecting matter with qualia is, IMO. I agree with Chalmers on this point.
-- Ben G
> -----Original Message-----
> From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org]On Behalf Of Norm
> Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 3:34 PM
> To: email@example.com
> Subject: RE: The return of the revenge of qualia, part VI.
> For the sake of argument, let's assume that conscious awareness
> and qualia arise automatically from physics and algorithms
> running on physical systems (i.e., "mind equals brain") and agree
> that the materialists are correct in that there is no "hard
> problem of consciousness" which needs to be explained. Under
> this assumption, I'd like to reformulate the hard problem in
> purely materialistic terms as one of "completeness", in which the
> burden is on the materialists to demonstrate that his or her
> particular model of consciousness is complete. I submit that
> this problem is just as hard as Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness.
> Norm Wilson
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