Re: Geddes's 'Moral Perturbation Theory'

From: Metaqualia (
Date: Sat Jul 03 2004 - 23:47:48 MDT

> I'd say qualia is a construct of nervous systems, not an external
> feature of nature (beyond the fact that nervous systems are part of
> nature). Its very hard to map from the experience of the internet to
> our own experience, since its wiring is quite different from our own.
> But it doesn't mean it doesn't experience.

and gravity is a construct of massive particles, not an external feature of
There is no real distinction here. Just, if you interpret the nervous system
as a strictly mechanical process, then you are forced to consider qualia as
somewhat "outside" the sysem. Just like if you describe the universe in
terms of particles located here and there you are forced to assume 'gravity'
is an external force acting on the particles.

If you see the brain like a computer qualia are an added extra; if you allow
for funky stuff to go on in computing systems of a certain (and so far
unknown) specific kind, then you're covered. That is not what I'm concerned
about though, what I'm concerned about is the idea that qualia whatever they
are provide the only qualitative assessment (_how_ is this? is it good or
bad? yellow or red?) for otherwise pointless and trivial physical patterns
(which would include qualia-less omega points, and all kinds of super zombie


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