From: Michael Roy Ames (michaelroyames@yahoo.com)
Date: Fri May 14 2004 - 09:47:07 MDT
Pablo,
>> Eg: Though I desire an espresso now, I know
>> that if I drink one I'll have trouble falling
>> asleep later, so I make myself a warm milk
>> instead.
>
> OK, but then we shouldn't describe the action
> as a case of allowing the agent to do what she
> wants to do.
>
Why shouldn't we? You seem to be viewing an agent's decision as being
spread out over time. This is simply incorrect. An agent makes a decision
at a specific time, and that decision represents what that agent wants to
do. We currently exist as beings who progress through time as like a point
along a line, in one direction. It makes no sense to ignore that and
suggest that an agent's wants become incoherent when viewed over a range of
times. That is just sophistry.
I don't rule out that there might exist different beings who occupy a range
of time-points, simultaneously (difficult word choice!) but we are not that
kind of being right now.
>
> Suppose I know I will be probably ruined if I
> continue gambling, but I decide to do it
> anyway. I'm then doing what is not in my best
> interest to do. I'm then acting irrationally.
>
To say that "agents not acting in their best interests are irrational" is
incorrect. An outside observer cannot decide what the best interests of a
volitional being are. It is the volitional being's responsibility to do
this. To forcefully take away that responsibility is morally negative.
>
> Eliezer's maxim, then, becomes inapplicable. [snip]
>
What is "Eliezer's maxim"?
>
> If we care about the person, why do we only consider a
> temporal phase of his? Why do we listen to his present
> desire to ruin his future temporal phases, and not to
> the future desires he will have NOT to have acted in a
> way that will have cost him his health, his wealth,
> and his happiness?
>
Because we respect his volition - his right to decide for himself. Who are
we to decide for him? Are we his nursemaid? His ruler? His god? Again, I
have no objections to offering assistance, help, aid and our best advice,
but the decision should rest with the volitional being.
>
> Maybe it's time to abandon normative
> individualism?
>
Nope. Don't think so.
>
> Maybe the fundamental units of moral/prudential
> assessment are not persons, but temporal phases?
>
I haven't heard a convincing argument for this. Right now I am a being like
a point on a timeline, with limited abilities at modeling the future and
myself in it. I have no ability to step off that timeline and assess what
actually happens over a "temporal phase" - that is beyond my capability.
Therefore, such an action cannot be the basis on which I can make a moral
assessment.
In your above statement, why do you join moral and prudential as
moral/prudential? They are two completely different ideas and joining them
makes no sense to me. A prudential assessment is utterly different from a
moral assessment.
>
> Maybe good and bad ultimately exist only in
> such unidimensional "locations"?
>
What do you mean by unidiminsional locations?
Michael Roy Ames
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