From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (sentience@pobox.com)
Date: Mon Dec 03 2001 - 13:31:25 MST
Gordon Worley wrote:
>
> In short, if people know they live in a simulation causes problems, this
> is not a simulation because we wouldn't be able to think about it,
> because thinking about it would ruin the simulation.
Under that logic, doesn't arriving at the above conclusion falsify it?
The normative chain of reasoning is probably as follows: "I don't know
whether or not the purpose of a simulation requires simulants unable to
think about the possibility that they occupy a simulation. If it does, my
thinking through this chain of reasoning shows that I am not in a
simulation. If not, my thinking through this chain of reasoning shows
nothing. That I am thinking through this chain of reasoning is therefore
very minor evidence against the general proposition that I am in a
simulation, but it certainly does not constitute proof."
But if instead someone concludes "...therefore I must not be in a computer
simulation," their apparent tendency to favor this non-normative
conclusion might be taken as evidence showing that
ERROR DETECTED AT ADDRESS 336996351123355
NON-PERMITTED DEDUCTION (TYPE 9)
RECOVERING COGNITIVE CONTENT TO PERMITTED STATE
this world is definitely *not* a computer simulation.
-- -- -- -- --
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://intelligence.org/
Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jul 17 2013 - 04:00:37 MDT