From: Mike Dougherty (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sun Mar 08 2009 - 21:54:21 MDT
On Sun, Mar 8, 2009 at 9:54 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <email@example.com>wrote:
> 2009/3/9 Mike Dougherty <firstname.lastname@example.org>:
> > I understood Matt's original position that we would choose A (with the
> > caveat that there is no lasting inexplicable physical damage) because the
> > consciousness with no memory of the experience is indistinguishable from
> > having not had the experience at all. A memory of fading intensity is
> > much more traumatic than no memory.
> Removing the memory does not make the experience benign. If it did, no
> experience would matter since we are all in the end demented or dead.
granted. But the point is about identity continuity around events or the
lack of memory of events.
For all the upload and teleport philosophical devices, I don't think this is
much different than if I were to get you so stupidly drunk that you had no
recollection of events at last night's party. If I told you that you did
XYZ heinous or embarrassing things, would you trust me and act accordingly?
What if I provided pictures? What if those pictures were expertly
photoshopped? Do you see how this might become a problem in a world where
memory is as easily constructed/manipulated as photoshopped images?
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