Re: Simulation argument in the NY Times

From: Matt Mahoney (matmahoney@yahoo.com)
Date: Mon Aug 20 2007 - 10:16:07 MDT


--- Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 20/08/07, Randall Randall <randall@randallsquared.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Aug 19, 2007, at 8:04 PM, Matt Mahoney wrote:
> > >
> > > I mean consciousness as that which distinguishes people from
> > > philosophical
> > > zombies.
> > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > But is there any reason to think that the concept of a
> > philosophical zombie makes any sense? In order for it
> > to make sense, you have to have found that consciousness
> > isn't a physical process. Do you believe you have
> > evidence for this view?
>
> It's logically possible that consciousness is due to a physical
> process, but a different physical process might result in no
> consciousness or different consciousness despite similar external
> behaviour.

Yes, but the definition of a p-zombie is that it has no experiences but is
otherwise indistinguishable from human. Therefore there can be no test for
consciousness in this sense. It means that if there is a physical process
associated with consciousness (in this sense), it is impossible to know what
it is.

It means that if you upload, it is impossible to know whether your
consciousness transferred to the copy. I am sure you have seen all the
convoluted arguments that result in absurd conclusions.

The logical conclusion is that there is no such thing as consciousness or
p-zombies. But then there is no reason to want to upload, or to fear death.

I know the source of my conflicting beliefs, and I know which one is wrong.
But this does not matter. Fear of death is hardcoded into the DNA of all
animals.

-- Matt Mahoney, matmahoney@yahoo.com



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