From: Vladimir Nesov (email@example.com)
Date: Fri Aug 17 2007 - 17:06:59 MDT
Saturday, August 18, 2007, Norman Noman wrote:
NN> On 8/17/07, Vladimir Nesov <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>> It's a question of being prepared. Say, you are being copied, so that
>> 1000 copies of you will be sent to labor camps and 1 copy of you is
>> given a substantial money compensation. One moment you are sitting in
>> a copying device, next moment there are 1001 of you. Which of them do
>> you expect yourself to become? With what probability?
>> This question is not correct: you will become each one of them.
>> Expectations before the procedure can only prepare you to operate
>> more effectively is _some_ of future situations. This is a tradeoff:
>> you can't have general expectations, so in some of the futures you
>> will be less prepared than in others. Choice of futures to prepare for
>> is arbitrary,
NN> If 1000 of me were
NN> getting shipped to the desert and one was getting shipped to mount everest,
NN> I'd be preparing for the desert because I'd rather there be more of me than
NN> less of me.
And if there's no existential risk? Why is more of you better than
less of you?
>> This is a kind of remnant of evolution, which tried to infect
>> as much future branches as possible with given DNA.
NN> I'm not really sure what this has to do with the topic at hand. Under the
NN> many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, everything is being split
NN> into zillions of possibilities constantly.
Yes, and agents are prepared to those possibilities to a different
degree. I was trying to make a point that number of simulators of each
kind doesn't affect subjective experience. If there is even a single
simulator with everything-enumerating TM (and I believe even one is not
required), estimation of what kind of simulation is likely to be
performed and what is not will not affect experience from subjective
Evolution produced a system that is sustained in our universe branch.
It is prepared to exist in this branch.
-- Vladimir Nesov mailto:email@example.com
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