Re: Existential Risk and Fermi's Paradox

From: David Picón Álvarez (eleuteri@myrealbox.com)
Date: Fri Jun 22 2007 - 18:27:13 MDT


> Kolmogorov might dispute that: if you can simplify the universe by
describing it with models, and those models can also describe things that
don't exist in this universe, you haven't added any complexity to the
models.

Hmm, complexity is perhaps not the best word to use, I didn't mean it in the
technical sense. My meaning is that mathematics can describe factual things
and counterfactual things, all the possible worlds, not only the world that
is. So I would expect the size of things that are required for describing
mathematics to be bigger than the size of things required to describe the
universe (only a subset of mathematics).

--David.



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