Re: Meta: Minds, Machines and Gödel

From: Jey Kottalam (
Date: Sun Feb 25 2007 - 13:49:25 MST

On 2/25/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <> wrote:
> Appealing to Gödel's incompleteness theorem, he
> argues that for any such automaton, there would be some mathematical formula
> which it could not prove, but which the human mathematician could both see,
> and show, to be true.

What's the proof or rationale to claim that the human mathematician
could "see and show it to be true" when the machine couldn't? The
human has some additional axioms in his head that the machine doesn't
have? If so, can't we tell the computer about these axioms?

-Jey Kottalam

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