From: Eric Rauch (email@example.com)
Date: Wed Dec 14 2005 - 07:26:28 MST
Given your skepticism of goal guided agi what do you think of the
goaless agi I suggested.
Also I'm curious as to how the members of this list maintain such a
high degree of certainty about the behavior of post singularity
intelligences which are almost by definition supposed to be beyond our
comprehension (richard this is not directed at you)
On 12/14/05, Richard Loosemore <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> Michael Vassar wrote:
> > Some posters seem to be very seriously unaware of what was said in
> > CAFAI, but having read and understood it should be a prerequisite to
> > posting here.
> > My complaints
> > Friendly AIs are explicitly NOT prevented from messing with their
> > source-code or with their goal systems. However, they act according to
> > decision theory. ....
> I have to go on record here as saying that I (and others who are poorly
> represented on this list) fundamentally disagree with this statement. I
> would not want readers of these posts to get the idea that this is THE
> universally agreed way to build an artificial intelligence. Moreover,
> many of the recent debates on this list are utterly dependent on the
> assumption that you state above, so to people like me these debates are
> just wheel-spinning built on nonsensical premises.
> Here is why.
> Friendly AIs built on decision theory have goal systems that specify
> their goals: but in what form are the goals represented, and how are
> they interpreted? Here is a nice example of a goal:
> "Put the blue block on top of the red block"
> In a Blocks World, the semantics of this goal - its "meaning" - are not
> at all difficult. All fine and good: standard 1970's-issue artificial
> intelligence, etc.
> But what happens when the goals become more abstract:
> "Maximize the utility function, where the utility function
> specifies that thinking is good"
> I've deliberately chosen a silly UF (thinking is good) because people on
> this list frequently talk as if a goal like that has a meaning that is
> just as transparent as the meaning of "put the blue block on top of the
> red block". The semantics of "thinking is good" is clearly not trivial,
> and in fact it is by no means obvious that the phrase can be given a
> clear enough semantics to enable it to be used as a sensible input to a
> decision-theory-driven AGI.
> The behavior of an AGI with such a goal would depend crucially on what
> mechanisms it used to interpret the meaning of "thinking is good". So
> much so, in fact, that it becomes stupid to talk of the system as being
> governed by the decision theory component: it is not, it is governed by
> whatever mechanisms you can cobble together to interpret that vague goal
> statement. What initially looked like the dog's tail (the mechanisms
> that govern the interpretation of goals) starts to wag the dog (the
> decision-theory-based goal engine).
> The standard response to this criticism is that while the semantics are
> not obvious, the whole point of modern AI research is to build systems
> that do rigorously interpret the semantics in some kind of compositional
> way, even in the cases of abstract goals like "thinking is good". In
> other words, the claim is that I am seeing a fundamental problem where
> others only see a bunch of complex implementation details.
> This is infuriating nonsense: there are many people out there who
> utterly disagree with this position, and who have solid reasons for
> doing so. I am one of them.
> So when you say "Friendly AIs [...] act according to decision theory."
> you mean "The particular interpretation of how to build a Friendly AI
> that is common on this list, acts according to decision theory."
> And, as I say, much of the recent discussion about passive AI and goal
> systems is just content-free speculation, from my point of view.
> Richard Loosemore
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