From: Phillip Huggan (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Fri Oct 28 2005 - 11:38:28 MDT
I agree with the first sentence. If someone shot my self of two seconds ago, I (in the present) would be horrified, but it would not really affect me unless it causally resulted in injury to my present self. But the second sentence is not true. If consciousness is a dynamic process which requires a finite length of time to operate, the source of the dichotomy might be that an upload only creates a copy of one's static brain topology. So in the very process of uploading, all subjective connection with the dynamic original is lost. Parallel selves splitting off identical or nearly identical copies off one's self in different universes throughout the multiverse; this natural uploading also doesn't maintain subjective continuity with the original. Personal identity is more than mere computation. It is strongly bounded by the physics of one's mental substrate. If true, this would place limits upon how far us humans (and post-humans) could "travel" in a post-singularity world.
There might be local sections of the universe we wouldn't want an AGI to mess around with too much if resources are limited. There might also be sections of the universe where only information (AGI) and not conscious physical substrates can travel to. A true FAI might find us an infinite energy source or maximize the volume of the universe available to us.
Tomaz Kristan <email@example.com> wrote:You can be on _different_ places at _different_ times. That's obvious and well supported by everyday experience.
When uploaded however, you are at two or more places at the same time. No big deal.
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