From: Marc Geddes (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 20:48:58 MDT
--- "J. Andrew Rogers" <email@example.com>
> Marc Geddes wrote:
> > "The following schematic proposes 28 universal
> > types for sentient minds. It is proposed that 7
> > universal knowledge domains (Matter, Mathematics,
> > Mentality, Meaning, Models, Morality and Mind)
> What do you need so many? And why don't some of
> these collapse into the same thing in
> implementation i.e. when not waxing eloquent from
> the ivory tower? Now that I think about
> it, you should add "Loyal", "Thrifty", and "Brave"
> to that list.
All of the universal knowledge domains are in some
sense equivalent i.e you can translate a description
of something in one domain to a description in
another. But I think they need to be seperated out -
different representations are useful for computational
tractibility for one thing.
> You should considering patenting this before it is
> too late. Many other AI researchers with
> lists-of-words designs have already patented their
> lists, and one of them may try to steal
> yours if it is better than theirs.
> j. andrew rogers
Heh. You're a funny guy j rogers. The truth is I'm
not worried about anyone stealing the ideas, because
no one here (on SL4) has the faintest prospect of ever
implementing a real AGI within the Bayesian framework.
I'm sorry to inform you AGI wannabes that the world
is quite safe from your puny efforts.
Let's see what one of the world's leading philosophers
of science has to say about Bayesian reasoning shall
we? This is a 'domain expert' so to speak, so let's
have a listen.
Quote by philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith:
"I think there is a more basic problem with the
arguments about convergence or the 'washing out' of
prior probabilities. The convergence proofs assume
that when two people start with very different priors,
they nonetheless agree about all their *likelihoods*
(probabilities of the form P(e1/h), etc.). That is
needed for disagreement about the priors to "wash
out". But why should we expect this agreement about
likihoods? Why should two people who disagree
massively on many things have the same likelihoods for
all possible evidence? Why don't their disagreements
affect their views on the *relevance* of possible
observations? This agreement *might* be present, but
there is no general reason why it should be. (This is
another aspect of the problem of holism.)
Presentations of Bayesianism often use simple examples
involving gambling games or sampling processes, in
which it seems that there will be agreement about
likelihoods even when people have different priors.
But these cases are not typical."
"Although Bayesianism is the most popular approach to
solving these problems today, I am not in the Bayesian
camp. Some parts of Bayesianism are undeniably
powerful, but I would cautiously put my money on some
--- THE BRAIN is wider than the sky, For, put them side by side, The one the other will include With ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson 'The brain is wider than the sky' http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html --- Please visit my web-site: Mathematics, Mind and Matter http://www.riemannai.org/ --- Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies. http://au.movies.yahoo.com
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