Re: Overconfidence and meta-rationality

From: maru (marudubshinki@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Mar 10 2005 - 17:47:55 MST


Marc Geddes wrote:

>>(Incidentally, it seems to me that the notion of the
>>Bayesian score cuts
>>through a lot of gibberish about freedom of priors;
>>the external
>>goodness of a prior is its Bayesian score. A lot of
>>philosophers seem
>>to think that, because there's disagreement where
>>priors come from, they
>>can pick any damn prior they please and none of
>>those darned
>>rationalists will be able to criticize them. But
>>there's actually a
>>very clearly defined criterion for the external
>>goodness of priors, the
>>question is just how to maximize it using internally
>>accessible
>>decisions. That aside...)
>>
>>
>
>Fascinating stuff. Fascinating, fascinating.
>
>You seem to be moving in the direction of Objective
>Bayesianism. Of course I always maintained that there
>is some 'universal' objective way to calibrate those
>priors.
>
>
>

Geddes, isn't that obvious? If there isn't a objective way of
calibrating priors,
and you picked whatever priors you pleased,
wouldn't you end up dead really, really fast?

~Maru
I guess you could say evolution weeds out gross errors in prior-choice.



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