From: Edmund Schaefer (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Mon Dec 13 2004 - 14:09:11 MST
On Mon, 13 Dec 2004 18:25:22 +1300 (NZDT), Marc Geddes
> In the fictional exmaple Ben is *not* assuming that
> the decision he is about to take is bad. He saying it
> *might* be bad. He is then asking if there is
> anything he can do to 'spread the risk' across
> alternative versions of himself in the multiverse, so
> as to ensure that some minimum fraction of hs
> alternative selves experience a good outcome.
You're also ensuring a minimum fraction experience a bad outcome. Why
assign a higher utility to a 100% chance of 50% surviving than to a
fifty-fifty split between "nearly all dead" and "nearly all alive"?
It's like being asked "Would you like $100 or a 50% chance of getting
$200?", but in a situation where there's no obvious diminishing
utility on the money you receive.
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