From: Emil Gilliam (emil@emilgilliam.com)
Date: Sat Sep 18 2004 - 21:08:48 MDT
> (c) a Bayesian strives to attain the best possible calibration of
> prior probabilities just as one strives for the best possible
> calibration in posterior probabilities, and just because
> mathematicians haven't *yet* all agreed on which formal, universal
> process to pick for doing this, doesn't change the goal or its
> importance;
But you don't *know* that there's a formal, universal process that
mathematicians will eventually agree on. Obviously they should keep
trying, but in the meantime you shouldn't assume there is one just
because the Bayesian religion requires it.
What happens if your Bayesian-to-the-utter-core FAI fails to discover a
formal, universal process?
- Emil
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