From: Ben Goertzel (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Mon Jul 05 2004 - 13:29:36 MDT
I agree with Mike LaTorra here.
In my view "qualia" is just a certain view or aspect of existing entities --
it can't be subtracted from entities any more than "being" or "time" or
"space" can, for example...
A hypothetical zombie-verse is no more realistic than a hypothetical
universe with no time. Some qualities are intrinsic to the nature of
existence. We may isolate them for the purpose of discussion or analysis
but this shouldn't lead us to conclude that they're really isolated.
-- Ben G
> -----Original Message-----
> From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org]On Behalf Of mike99
> Sent: Monday, July 05, 2004 3:19 PM
> To: email@example.com
> Subject: RE: Geddes's 'Moral Perturbation Theory'
> You mentioned qualia-less things such as "super zombie worlds."
> So far as I know, no one has ever proposed a test that could identify a
> zombie as such, when by all appearances, actions, and communications,
> zombies are indistinguishable from non-zombies. (Like, presumably you and
> me. Or maybe just you?)
> Saying that we possess qualia but zombies do not is like saying that we
> possess souls and zombie do not. In other words, it's saying nothing
> Mike LaTorra
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:email@example.com]On Behalf Of
> > Metaqualia
> > Sent: Saturday, July 03, 2004 11:48 PM
> > To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> > Subject: Re: Geddes's 'Moral Perturbation Theory'
> > > I'd say qualia is a construct of nervous systems, not an external
> > > feature of nature (beyond the fact that nervous systems are part of
> > > nature). Its very hard to map from the experience of the internet to
> > > our own experience, since its wiring is quite different from our own.
> > > But it doesn't mean it doesn't experience.
> > and gravity is a construct of massive particles, not an external
> > feature of
> > nature?
> > There is no real distinction here. Just, if you interpret the
> > nervous system
> > as a strictly mechanical process, then you are forced to consider
> > qualia as
> > somewhat "outside" the sysem. Just like if you describe the universe in
> > terms of particles located here and there you are forced to
> > assume 'gravity'
> > is an external force acting on the particles.
> > If you see the brain like a computer qualia are an added extra;
> > if you allow
> > for funky stuff to go on in computing systems of a certain (and so far
> > unknown) specific kind, then you're covered. That is not what I'm
> > concerned
> > about though, what I'm concerned about is the idea that qualia
> > whatever they
> > are provide the only qualitative assessment (_how_ is this? is
> it good or
> > bad? yellow or red?) for otherwise pointless and trivial
> physical patterns
> > (which would include qualia-less omega points, and all kinds of
> > super zombie
> > worlds).
> > mq
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