From: Eliezer Yudkowsky (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu Jun 03 2004 - 12:00:58 MDT
Wei Dai wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 02, 2004 at 12:09:58PM -0400, Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:
>>The point of the analogy is to postulate al-Qaeda programmers smart enough
>>to actually build an AI. Perhaps a better phrase in (5) would be, "avoid
>>policies which would create conflicts of interest if multiple parties
>>followed them". Categorical Imperative sort of thing. I am *not* going to
>>"program" my AI with the instruction that Allah does not exist, just as I
>>do not want the al-Qaeda programmers programming their AI with the
>>instruction that Allah does exist. Let the Bayesian Thingy find the map
>>that reflects the territory. So the al-Qaeda programmers would advise me,
>>for they know I will not listen if they mention Allah in their advice.
> But where does the Bayesian prior come from? Al Qaeda has its prior, and
> you have yours. What to do except fight?
I think that this abuses the term "Bayesian prior", which with regard to AI
design is not meant to refer to current beliefs, but to the ur-prior, which
I would expect to be the Principle of Indifference over identifiable
interchangeable spaces, and for more complex problems Solomonoff induction
on simple programs and simple conceptual structures. And even this
ur-prior can be refined by checking its parameters against the test of
complex reasoning, tweaking the hypothesis space to more closely match
observed reality. I think. I haven't checked the math.
"Allah exists", "Allah does not exist" is not an appropriate thing to have
in an ur-prior at all, and anyone programming in arbitrary propositions
into the ur-prior with a probability of 10^11 or something equally
ridiculous is playing nitwit games. (And my current understanding of FAI
design indicates this nitwit game would prove inconsistent under
reflection.) Any reasonable assignment of ur-priors would let the evidence
wash away any disagreement. If you can possibly end up fighting over
ur-priors, you're not just a jerk, you're a non-Bayesian jerk. Ur-priors
are not arbitrary; they calibrate against reality, like any other map and
>>Reading... read. Relevant stuff, thanks.
> Did reading it cause you to change some of your designs. If so how?
No, but it gives me somewhere to track down more complicated math of
expected utility, which I need to do at some point.
-- Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://intelligence.org/ Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
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