RE: On the subjective experience of consciousness

From: Paul Hughes (
Date: Mon Mar 29 2004 - 14:22:18 MST

--- Ben Goertzel <> wrote:
> > A purely mechanistic third person account of
> conscious experience has
> > all the observable attributes and characteristics
> of a first person
> > account. But the third-person account is simpler
> and more
> > consistent,
> > therefore preferable as an explanation. There is
> no reason to
> > hypothesize some mysterious state to explain our
> first-person
> > experience
> > of consciousness. Of course it *feels* the way it
> does.

I would disagree. If we examine this problem using
the 'easy problem of consciousness' your remarks are
self-consistent concurrently with Ben G's assement of
simplicity in regards to the context from which we
examine it.

However, from the 'hard problem of consciousness' your
perspective doesn't resolve the problematic issues
raised by it, it simply reverts back to the 'easy
problem of consciousness', which fails miserably to
address the hard problem.

Paul Hughes

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