From: Ben Goertzel (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu May 29 2003 - 19:49:42 MDT
> >> Volition is a component of "deep, real human happiness" but I
> don't think
> >> it's the only component.
> >> One could construct extreme cases of human minds that were strongly
> >> self-determined yet were morally and aesthetically repugnant to all of
> >> us...
> > That's not the question, though; the question is whether we, or a
> > Friendly AI, should interfere with such a mind.
A nontrivial moral question, right?
As a parent, I would interfere with my child's self-determination if they
were going to do something sufficiently destructive. I'd also try to change
them so that they no longer *wanted* to do the destructive thing.
Because we have values for our kids that go beyond the value of
But we presumably don't want a Friendly AI to take on this kind of parental
role to humans -- because it's simply too dangerous??
-- Ben G
> Er, to amplify: I was not saying that volition is the only element of
> human happiness, but that it should be substituted into the role
> played by
> "human happiness" in utilitarian schemas. Maybe some people
> don't want to
> be happy; or maybe they have things they value higher than
> happiness. I do.
> Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://intelligence.org/
> Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
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