Re: Infinite universe

From: Psy-Kosh (
Date: Tue Apr 29 2003 - 19:44:59 MDT

Hash: SHA1

> You're *within* U. *You yourself* are part of the play and flow of

> probabilities. In the moment when you decide whether to help or
> someone, that decision is embodied in the flow of the probability
> amplitudes, and the future correlates with your decision. Of
course the
> future is determined. It's determined by the probability
> It's determined by you. It's determined by your decision. All
> statements are equivalent.

Yes, of course I'm a part of U. But...

> The timeless form of the decision rule is that given choices A vs.
B, you
> should consider the state of the multiverse given that your
decision is A,
> versus its state given that your decision is B, then pick whichever
> corresponds to the more desirable state. Only correlation is
necessary -
> not "time" or "causality". Note that this resolves Newcomb's

Me making choice A or B simply means _being_ the branch of the
multiverse corresponding to my making that decision. There is of
course another "I" that makes the other choice.

The state of the multiverse is independant of which choice I made
becuase in the context of U, the concept is meaningless. Only when
one is not working with the entirety of U does it become meaningful.
ie, U containes the "I" that made choice A, but it _also_ contains
the "I" that made choice B. However, From the perspective of the "I"
that made choice A, the other branch has been "cut off", so from
I(A)'s perspective, the universe has changed in the way corresponding
to action A. However, from I(B)'s perspective, the branch
corresponding to A has been pruned off. Thus, from I(B)'s
perspective, the universe has been changed in the way coresponding to
action B.

> Making "meaningful choices" means that the computation embodying
> decision is what determines the future. To make meaningful
choices, the
> future must be determined by "mere" physics, and we ourselves must
> "mere" physics, because only in this way can *we* determine the
> The future is determined; it's determined by the physical process
that is
> your choice, now. Knowing in the abstract that the future is
> is not the same as knowing *what* the future is determined to be;
> future is determined by you, yourself, making a choice under
> If you don't yet know your choice, you can't possibly know the
> deterministic future, because what the future is determined by, is
> choice.

I was not in any way arguing against that. What I was simply saying
is that no matter what choice I make, another "I" will make the other
choice, and the future corrsponding to that will also be.

> Your choice at T+1 is determined by the physical process at time T
that is
> your mind, but at time T, that physical process doesn't yet
> represent ("know") what its choice will be, so it doesn't
> represent ("know") the outcome at time T+2 of any processes
determined by
> that choice. The outcome at time T+2 is determined by the
computations of
> a cognitive process at T which does not yet know its own decision
at T+1.
> That's what we call "free will". Note the noncoincidental
> to the halting problem.

Actually, I think of free will as the experiancing of specific
branches. The me that choses A is the me that is the branch
corresponding to be choosing A, and similar for B.

> Now you can get messed up if you know the abstract fact that the
future is
> determined by physics, and you think of "physics" as something
> yourself, rather than a system that includes you as a part. You
may get
> the idea that the future is dependent on something other than your

> decisions, or that your decisions are determined by something other
> your own cognition under uncertainty.

Again, I wasn't arguing against that.


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