Re: The problem of cognitive closure

From: Mitchell Porter (
Date: Fri Mar 16 2001 - 17:34:49 MST

--- "Eliezer S. Yudkowsky" <>

> What I want is some kind of Bayesian-useful account
> of how a monad-dualist
> Chalmersian universe differs from this our Universe,
> or how a totally
> computable universe would differ from this our
> monad-dualist universe.

I'm not a dualist. I'm just making quarks out of
qualia, rather than qualia out of quarks. Qualia
are what you know to exist; quarks are what you
hypothesize to exist. But if you think that quarks
are *all* that exist, you then have the hard
problem, of why being a swarm of quarks feels like
anything. So, start with models which by design
include qualia, and see if you can extend them
to the point that you recover the quarks. Right
away you hit a new problem, the unity of
consciousness: qualia are bundled together in
experience, but quarks (naively) are independent
entities. So, start again, with models involving
bundles of qualia; these are the monads. And hey,
maybe the bundling shows up as that conceptually
puzzling 'entanglement' which quarks exhibit.

Now I don't know how to translate that into
Bayesian reasoning. But how much is a solution
to the hard problem of qualia worth?

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